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Abstract—Code reuse attack (CRA), specifically reusing and
then reconstructing the codes (gadgets) already existed in
programs and libraries, is widely exploited in software attacks.
Admittedly, determination of the location of the gadgets con-
sisted of target instructions along with control flow transfer
instructions, is of critical importance. Address Space Random-
ization (ASR), which serves as an effective technique to mitigate
CRA, increases the entropy by randomizing the location of the
code or data, and baffles adversaries from figuring out the
memory layout. Currently, variable randomization methods
of high granularity are proposed by scholars to prevent
adversaries from deducting memory layout. However, their
credibility on alleviating CRA is yet to be confirmed, especially
when the suitable pointer is exposed to adversaries. In this
paper, we focus on studying what kinds of function leakage
can lead to a CRA more likely. A function risk assessment
model focusing on function coupling is proposed to quantify
the risk caused by the suitable function pointer leakage and
it is extended to assess the risk of the whole program and
library under the memory leakage. Our experimental results
show that popular open-source software is vulnerable when
certain code pointer is leaked to adversaries and even severer
when the system library is accessible. In addition, suggestions
to eliminate function coupling and evaluate the availability of
randomization methods are further discussed.
Keywords-Code Reuse Attack; Randomization; Risk Assess-
ment; Memory Leakage;
I. INTRODUCTION
The memory war is effectively an arms race between
offense and defense [1]. Code injection is one of the classic
attacks by transferring control flow to the injected shellcode.
However, Data execution prevention (DEP) [2] prevents code
injection by restricting the execution of data segments. To
bypass the non-executable data policy, attackers start to use
Code Reuse Attack (CRA), which hijacks the control flow
of programs by reusing several existing code (gadgets) and
has been proven to be Turing complete [3].
Since CRA needs to obtain the accurate addresses of
the used gadgets, Address Space Randomization(ASR) is
proposed by remapping the memory layout to make it more
difficult for attackers to guess the memory layout as their
offline analysis are not accurate. Address space layout ran-
domization (ASLR) [4], belonging to ASR, randomizes the
base address of the memory segment, has been widely used
in operating system. However, attackers can use information
leakage to get a memory address, and then guess the memory
layout according to this address. Function-level randomiza-
tion is also one kind of ASR, which randomizes the order
of the function in memory to achieve finer granularity of
the randomization. Compared with ASLR, it increases the
entropy of randomization and makes offline analysis more
difficult. But in the case of information leakage, its entropy
does not seem to be able to measure its effectiveness. This
is also true of fine-grained randomization.
When the memory address of a function is leaked, the
attacker can traverse the internal information of the func-
tion through the program vulnerability. A function often
includes arithmetic instructions, stack pivot instructions,
stack pop/push instructions, and control transfer instructions
(such as direct or indirect function calls, function return
instructions, and direct or indirect jump instructions). An
attacker can find the location of other functions by reading
the function calls. The gadgets chain in CRA can be con-
structed by using the return instruction, the indirect jump
instruction, and the indirect function call instruction. One
issue here is up for debate: what kinds of functions make
it easy for an attacker to finish the attack under information
leakage? It is necessary to explore the function risk under
memory leakage. In this paper, we propose a function risk
metric model which can be exploited by both adversaries
and defenders. It measures the function risk focusing on the
prudent attacker, and it is extended to measure the overall
program.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We establish an attack model under information leakage
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of a pointer which can bypass randomization methods.
• We establish a function risk assessment model focusing
on function coupling, which memory permission mod-
ification functions, indirect function instructions and
system calls are taken into consideration;
• We make an empirical study of the attack model and
the assessment model and give some suggestions to
eliminate function coupling and evaluate the availability
of randomization methods.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the
background of this paper including CRA, randomization and
information leakage. Section III sets up the model of attacks.
Security metric of function coupling risk is discussed in
section IV. Our experimental results are shown in section V.
Section VI discusses the advantage and limitation of the
model and gives suggestions for future randomization. Fi-
nally, related works and conclusions are illustrated in section
VII and VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
We first review the basics of important concepts (namely,
the code reuse attack strategy and fine-grained memory
and code randomization) that are vital to understanding the
remainder of this paper.
A. Code Reuse Attack
Code Reuse Attack (CRA) hijacks the control flow of a
program by reusing several existing code (gadgets) without
injecting external code into memory and has been proven
to be Turing complete. Adversaries can use CRA and code
injection to bypass the security mechanism, such as ASLR
and DEP. For example, if an attacker wants to execute
some code with the protection of DEP, the first step is to
chain some gadgets to disable DEP. Without DEP protection,
EIP is overwritten so as to point to the beginning of the
shellcode which is injected before, then the shellcode will
be successfully executed.
To accomplish a CRA, one of the challenges concerning
the attacks’ solution is to ensure the exact address of each
gadget in the memory space. Since ASLR randomizes the
base address of the target program, it makes the attacker
unable to obtain these addresses off-line without information
leakage vulnerability or brute force.
B. Randomization
With CRA applied widely, security researchers have
proposed a variety of randomization strategies. The main
idea of which is to randomize the position of the target
program’s code and data segments in the memory space to
increase the difficulty of gadget chain execution as expected.
Randomization techniques are classified into four main cat-
egories: Base address randomization [4], [5], Function-level
randomization [6], [7], [8], [9], Basic block-level randomiza-




Base address Randomization Randomize base address
Function-level Randomization Randomize function locations
Basic-block-level Randomization Randomize basic block locations
Instruction-level Randomization Randomize instruction locations
or replace instruction sequence
[14], [15], [16]. Those randomization techniques are listed
in table I.
ASLR, attached to base address randomization, random-
izes the base address of stack, heap, code segment and
libraries. Computer programs written by the high-level lan-
guages such as C/C++ are mostly composed of functions.
Function-level randomizations reorder the location of func-
tions, and thus the addresses of gadgets are shifted by the
randomizations, which baffle adversaries from figuring out
the memory layout. Function-level randomization is mainly
designed against the off-line analysis from where adversaries
obtain gadgets for the CRA. Other fine-grained random-
ization schemes are similar to function-level randomization
by utilizing different granularity location displacement or
equivalent instruction substitution to invalidate the off-line
analysis.
C. Memory Leakage
All the methods mentioned in section II-B increase the in-
formation entropy of randomness. Albeit with the existence
of information disclosure vulnerability, drawbacks of some
randomization techniques will be exposed. Information dis-
closure serves as auxiliary within an attack, with which the
pointer errors are generated through the memory corruption
bugs. Simultaneously, the memory layout is revealed with
these pointers. Information disclosure is the most destructive
techniques to bypass the randomization algorithms, which
is exploited in many attacks, such as CVE-2013-2839[17]
and CVE-2014-0322[18]. When the location of some code
in memory is obtained by adversaries, the known memory
space relevance can be used in the off-line analysis to
speculate the actual memory layout, thus bypassing the
protection of randomization.
In this paper, we only consider the memory leakage with
which program vulnerabilities are exploited to read memory
information through functions such as Write(). And informa-
tion disclosure at the macro level, such as the disclosure of
user identity information by side channel attack, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
III. ASSUMPTION AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We now turn on our assumptions and adversary model.




This paper is concerned with attacks that bypass fine-
grained randomization approaches, namely ones that give
the attacker a leaked pointer in a function, then addresses
of remaining functions are obtained by reading transfer
instructions inside the function and then arbitrary malicious
operations can be executed by reusing these code. Thus, we
assume the adversary is able to exercise one of these pre-
existing vulnerability and obtain the leaked pointer.
In what follows, we assume that the target platform
uses the following mechanisms to mitigate the execution of
malicious operations:
• Non-Executable Memory: We assume that the security
model of non-executable memory is applied to the stack
and heap. Hence, the adversary cannot inject code into
the program’s data area.
• ASLR: We assume that address space layout random-
ization is applied to the target platform.
• Fine-Grained Randomization: We assume that the
target platform enforces fine-grained code randomiza-
tion. In particular, we assume a strong fine-grained
randomization scheme which permutes the order of
functions [6].
Notice that, since ASLR is deployed, the first step of our
adversary model is to bypass it with information leakage.
In addition, we also assume that the adversary has the
capability to analyze the vulnerable programs off-line.
B. Adversary Model
With these assumptions, we highlight our adversary model
in Fig.1. In step 1, the adversary finds usable gadgets and the
internal function dependency by off-line analysis. In step 2,
given the leaked pointer, a particular function serving as the
first ascertainable, readable and executable area of the attack
model is located. More importantly, the following steps of
attack model searching available gadgets and function call
instructions start from the informations of this function. In
step 3, from this function, the memory space is searched
forwards and backwards by traversing the function call
instructions in this function until the boundary of a function
is identified. Methods searching for boundaries of functions
in binary codes are categorized in two kinds. The first
category is based on characteristics of function. For example,
in x86, functions without optimization mostly begin with
instructions like push ebp; mov ebp esp; sub esp xxx;
and end with instructions like ret. Consequently, function
space can be determined through features described above.
Another is the heuristic method based on learning. Various
scholars achieve their aim of identifying function space by
training models with enormous features. By applying this
searching technique iteratively on each function found, we
can build a function dependency tree and collect the useful
gadgets. In step 4, we construct the dispatcher with available
Figure 1. Adversarial Model
gadgets and inject it along with the invocation parameters
into the target program’s memory space.
This model collects not only the information of the
gadgets but also the call relation between functions at the
off-line analysis stage. It is the kernel on the demonstration
that the function relationship (coupling) can be used by the
adversary to acquire information about more gadgets.
Another famous way to bypass fine-grained ASR is Just-
in-time ROP (JIT-ROP)[19]. It also requires a leaked pointer
to trigger memory leaks, and the pointer is then applied to
read pointed memory page code. Consequently, a number of
memory pages are disassembled to find required gadgets by
traversing the control flow instructions. But this method is
not suitable for some fine-grained randomization methods.
Modern compilers, such as LLVM, have already equipped
each function with an exclusive section, page access errors
is generated when traversing the contents of page space
external to the function. Moreover, future randomization
methods could conduct access control of finer granularity.
More specifically, when using the current function, reading
errors may occur over the upper and lower memory space
beyond the range of the function. Therefore, the direct
utilization of JIT-ROP is not necessarily successful. During
every searching process, the attack model proposed in this
paper searches for gadgets merely in the internal space of
the determined function instead of moving pointers beyond
the function space. Thus it can defend the defense strategy
of page-guard.
IV. SECURITY METRIC OF FUNCTION RISK
In this section, we give the function risk assessment model
based on the adversary model proposed in Section III. It
studies how function coupling would affect the capability of
an adversary to finish the attack.
A. Function Risk Assessment
Security evaluation of function risk focusing on function
coupling should be concentrated on whether adversaries can
finish attacks with the leaked function pointer.
Here, we first give the overall security evaluation formula
that studies what factors would affect the success of an
attack:
Leak attack ∩ Leak code = Ø (1)
Leak attack = Attack plan1 ∪ ... ∪Attack plann (2)
286
Leak code = Leak func1 ∪ ... ∪ Leak funcn (3)
Where, Leak attack illustrates the possible attacking plans
for an adversary to reach the goal; Leak code represents all
the gadgets available in the leaked functions; Attack plan
comprises the gadget chains that an attacker used to achieve
the attacking purpose; Leak func is a group of the gadgets
the function leaked. We will introduce these definitions of
the symbols in the follow-up in detail.
1) Attack plan: There are a variety of ways for an
adversary to accomplish the attack goal. For example, in
the platform of x86, if adversaries want to use a system call,
they can store the corresponding parameters in the register
of eax and ecx, and then call int 0x80 to complete the
attack.
Adversary can also accomplish this goal by using the gad-
get pop eax; pop ecx; ret, with the only need to pre-deposit
values of eax, ecx and addresses containing int 0x80
instructions onto the stack. Besides, when adversaries can
take control of the ebx register, they can exploit mov ebx,
eax; ret; mov ebx, ecx; ret at the same goal. In addition, an
adversary can exploit the dispatcher to complete the attack
based on the JOP [20] attack and the COOP attack by
modifying the pointer in the virtual function table. Since
a variety of plans to achieve an attack are effective to
adversaries, any successful plans can lead to severe security
problems in software. We define all the aggregation of
Attack plan as Leak attack, and it contains all possible plan
that attacks can accomplish the goal.
2) Leak func: Each Leak func represents the gadgets
adversaries can find by the leaked function pointer. These
gadgets may be in different functions, but they can be found
by function call graph. Through the program’s vulnerability,
an adversary may not merely locate a function address in
the initial case, and there we use Leak code to represent
all gadgets that an adversary can get through information
leakage. And Leak code is a collection of all Leak func
gadgets.
As shown, there are various attack plans for an adversary
to achieve the attacking goal. As long as the leaked code
is sufficient to finish one of the attack plans, the attack can
be considered to be theoretically successful. Therefore, the
most important factor that affects the success of an attack
is whether the Leak code can be used to finish one attack
plan. If it contains some high-risk functions, attackers may
find many useful gadgets to accomplish the attack. In the
next section, we will discuss how to measure the risk of a
function.
B. Security Metric Model
It’s universally known that the ROOT are capable of
operating system unlimitedly. Therefore, the most direct and
effective attacks of adversaries are conducted by obtaining
system permissions, namely the ubiquitous syscall(int$80)
in system library. Consequently, the functions accessible to
syscall with function correlation are defined as the highest
risk function (Level 1), while the MHR, a bool value,
serves as the criteria of whether the highest risk function
is associated with syscall.
Generally, attackers are inaccessible to the location of
syscall and thus forced to accomplish attacks in a round-
about way by injecting particular malicious codes. Hence,
adversaries tend to exploit the memory permission mod-
ification functions (mprotect, virtualprotect) or the exe-
cutable memory application functions (memalign, memset)
to guarantee the execution of their injected code. Eventually,
functions accessible to the two category functions mentioned
above are defined as the higher risk function (Level 2), while
the HR is the criteria of whether a function can access to
these functions.
Strictly speaking, without the level 1 nor the level 2
risk functions, the function itself is relatively vulnerable
with combination of gadgets. Exploiting the indirect transfer
instructions (e.g. call *%rax, jmp *%rax) for control flows’
recombination, adversaries manage to transfer the execution
flow to the location of desired gadgets. Therefore, functions
that are accessible to indirect transfer instructions are defined
as the medium risk function (Level 3), while the MR is the
criteria of access to indirect transfer instructions.
Scarcely, adversaries are merely to modify certain data or
register values in nondestructive purpose. Referring to func-
tions that are accessible to low-risk function, for example,
capable of partial arithmetical operation, we classified them
as the low-risk function (Level 4). In consideration of CRA’s
proven Turing Completeness, all functional interval instruc-
tions are consequently regarded with potential computation
behaviors and categorized in low-risk function. Especially,
the LR is the criteria of access to arithmetic operations.
Here we introduce a four-dimensional axial vector to
represent individually the risk level in sequence from high
to low. Metric vector α1 = (1, 0, 0, 0) represents for the
highest risk level; α2 = (0, 1, 0, 0) for the high risk level
and so on. Following formulas illustrate the integrated risk
of functions:
RISK FUNC = MHR∗α1+HR∗α2+MR∗α3+LR∗α4
(4)
According to the equation, the integrated risk of a particu-
lar function is obtained as RISK FUNC, through which the
existing risk of a given function can be intuitively judged.
It can be inferred from the diversity of RISK value that 16
different risk value is possibly existed in a given function,
specifically (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1). Simultaneously, program
risk value is obtained by accumulating individual function
risk value:




i=1 RISK FUNCi (5)
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Table II
INFORMATION LEAKAGE FROM ”MAIN”
Name POP MOV ARI Indirect call
Nginx 6794 55 3786 246
tar 54716 7848 21442 4168
omnetpp 58 79 10 17
soplex 1103 1861 244 37
bzip2 210 212 31 8
astar 287 232 125 1
With the RISK PGM calculated above, risk value of
a given program can be quantified. With each dimension
representing exact number of risk categorized into corre-
sponding risk level , the program risk of each dimension
can be eventually evaluated, which is of critical importance
to eliminate the program risk of each dimension.
C. Metric’s Application
Both the adversary and defender could use this metric
model.
For adversaries, when they are digging out memory
leakage vulnerabilities, High-risk programs could be found
according to the program risk metric model (or the value
of RISK PGM). Then, functions which are easily exploited
to accomplish the attack target are shown with the function
risk metric model (or the value of RISK FUNC). Finally,
the adversary could dig out vulnerabilities of those targeted
functions.
There are two aspects that could use the metric model
for defenders. First, our model can be used to measure
the overall risk of a program, so the designers of security
solutions can put forward lower risk program design or
reinforcement plan to reduce the values of all dimensions
of risk. On the other hand, defenders can find and fix
vulnerabilities for higher risk function calculated by formula
(4) to prevent adversaries from exploiting these functions to
complete the attack target.
V. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we carry out the experimental analysis of
the metric model mentioned above, with the open source
software nginx, gzip to show the application of the metric
model under Linux. These frequently used software are
selected as ideal experimental tools for their compiling
source code without obfuscation or packer featured as open
source as well as convenience in static analysis.
A. Attack Model Experiment
Given the adversaries can locate the address of main
function through information leakage, they can consequently
acquire the number of gadgets from all kinds of ROP
instructions, as shown in Table II. As we can see, an
adversary can get thousands of available gadgets, which are









registers of indirect call Attack
paths
number
Nginx 1052 715 rax r13 r15 rdx rcx rbp 7039988
tar 790 718 rax r13 r15 r12 rdx rcx r8
r14 rbx rbp
56376638
omnetpp 2495 2249 rax rbx rcx r8 r12 rsi rdi 4767650
soplex 1499 266 rax rbx r12 rcx rdx 143188
bzip2 129 28 rax 16852
astar 161 6 rax 1386
We assumed that the adversary’s purpose is to exploit
the indirect call instruction to jump to any address. One
attack plan may need three instructions, the first of which is
the indirect call instruction namely call *%rax. In addition,
as the rax registers are overwritten into the address the
adversaries plan to jump to, adversaries need instructions
to modify its value, such as mov %rbx, %rax; RET or pop
%rax; ret. Therefore, we search for the program according
to the target. In the experiment, we use static analysis to get
the function that may accomplish the attack in assumption of
that the adversary use only less than 3 gadgets to complete
the attack plan. Our statistical results are shown in Table
III.
As shown, it’s obvious that most mainstream software
contains indirect function call instructions, among which
rax is the most widely used register. Under the assumption
that information disclosure vulnerability may exist in each
function, with only a function vulnerability, registers are
reachable to be controlled along enormous attack paths to
launch an indirect call by our attack model. In different
programs, the proportion of functions related to indirect
jump instructions varies, as it is relevant to the extent of
function coupling. With stronger coupling of functions, a
single function may be directly or indirectly associated with
more functions contained indirect jump instructions. In sum-
mary, some suggestions are given for software modification
in section VI.
In order to automate the attack model, we have designed
an automated attack process. Suppose there is a stack over-
flow vulnerability in the compress function in bzip2, that is,
an adversary can control the execution stream by modifying
the data in the stack. Then, adversaries can automatically
attack along the path. It is shown in Fig. 2.
First of all, in the off-line analysis phase, we have
learned that two functions related to compress function have
instructions that can control the register of the indirect call
instructions. Then, when conducting the actual attack, in the
first step, we use the information disclosure vulnerability
in the compress function. According to the correlation, we
can find uInt64 from UInt32s function, then we traverse
the function space to find the stack pivot instructions to
control the stack frame pointers pointing to our overflow
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Figure 2. An example of attack path
Figure 3. nginx attack paths
point. Then, in the second step, we continue to traverse the
entire function and find the mov, mov, pop,retq instructions
shown in the Fig. 2. The rax register is modified to the
destination address that adversaries want to jump to with the
instructions. Finally, we have found the BZ2 bzCompressInit
function according to the correlation, and use the call
instruction to finish the attack.
We also verify the feasibility of our attack mod-
el through a real vulnerability. CVE-2013-2058 is a
Nginx buffer overflow vulnerability, caused by er-
rors in integer types. This vulnerability occurs in
ngx http read discarded request body, where we start with
this function and use our model to find that there are three
attack paths that can invoke indirect function calls. The
specific attack path is shown in Fig.3. It is known that
adversaries can exploit functions with memory allocation or
memory permission modification, namely posix memalign
and mprotect. According to experiments conducted with the
attack model established, there are 500 functions along with
7446 attacking paths possibly lead to the adversary to locate
the address of posix memalign. Eventually, through proper
parameters to invoke posix memalign, adversaries can apply
the executable permission to memory space.
B. Security Metric
In this section, some system libraries are analyzed ac-
cording to the security metric model. Since the highest risk
functions are generally found in shared libraries, library
libc− 2.13.so is therefore analyzed subsequently. Given li-
brary possesses 1741 functions, of which 1008 are associated
Table IV










Libc.so 1741 1008 29 653 (1008,29,653,1741)
Libm.so 295 0 0 5 (0,0,5,295)
Ld.so 16 7 0 6 (7,0,6,16)
Libncurses.so 310 0 4 4 (0,4,4,310)
Libnsl.so 129 0 0 35 (0,0,35,129)
Libpthread.so 354 221 24 20 (221,24,20,354)
Libresolv.so 91 0 0 2 (0,0,2,91)
with syscall, while 5985955 paths can lead to syscall .
Similarly, several other shared libraries are analyzed, the
results of which are shown in Table IV.
The MHR, HR and MR represents the corresponding
risk level of the whole library function. Through analysis
of these library functions, there are two libraries which
are accessible with syscall that are possibly exploited by
adversaries. According to the value calculated by our model,
adversaries tend to exploit libraries containing amount of
syscall in attacks and locate function pointer leakage acces-
sible to syscall with formula 4 accordingly. Additionally.
when judging the severity (consisting of more high-risk
instructions) of programs or libraries, we cannot rely merely
on the quantity of code but the actual statistics that the
accurate results can be obtained by our risk model.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Advantages and Limitations
We establish an attack method to bypass randomization.
The traditional evaluation of randomization only evaluates
the randomization itself without the specific analysis of the
application scenario. Our experimental results in this paper
show that the effectiveness of the randomization depends
not only on the randomization method, but also on the
randomized program itself. On the other hand, compared
with the general attack methods, the attack model established
in this paper is closer to the realistic scene with fine-grained
randomization, which can be used for automatic attacks.
There are some limitations for the model proposed in this
paper. With the lack of the industrial deployment scenarios,
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there are fewer examples to verify the model. And the
adversary may use other types of gadgets which are not
mentioned in this paper, so the model can be improved in
the future.
B. Eliminating coupling
Through the analysis of the attack model and our experi-
mental results, it can be concluded that it’s the confirmation
of functional relevance, namely the function coupling, that
makes the adversaries locate other function and successful-
ly complete attack by acquiring gadgets. Hence, in order
to defend attacks relying on function coupling, defenders
should be prudent on how to eliminating function coupling.
In consideration of this, some solutions are given as follows:
1) Hide function call instructions in memory space invis-
ible to adversaries, specifically in sgx or unreadable
memory page, and subsequently replace these instruc-
tions with control flow transfer instructions in original
program locations. Therefore, functional relevance is
inaccessible to adversaries and memory leak is avoided
more or less.
2) Insert some fake functional invoke and baffle adver-
saries from effective analysis. When fake functional
invoke is pointed to particular locations that are likely
to crash down programs, the actual coupling degree
of functions are decreased and memory leak based on
program internal correlation is defended.
3) Insert some fake control flow transfer instructions, and
fabric an enclosure with unity of those transfer instruc-
tions through construction of transfer instructions’
target location, with which analysis of adversaries
conducted based on functional relevance would be
invalid.
Solutions above can be realized with from source-code
to binary-code and attributed to secondary reinforcement of
existed programs. Although they can effectively alleviate
attacks based on program internal relevance, we strongly
recommend that program developer and program language
designer can optimize their solutions at the stage of pro-
graming and compiling.
VII. RELATED WORK
Modern Operating Systems (OS) use DEP to disable
shellcode execution. Therefore, in order to bypass the data
execution protection, Code Reuse Attack (CRA) uses the
program’s existing code(gadget) is generated. CRA includes
ret2lib [21], ROP [3], and Jump-oriented programming
(JOP) [20]. Nowadays, OS introduces the security mech-
anism of ASLR [4] to randomize the layout of memory
segments, which increases the difficulty of the attacker
on guessing the actual address. However, the attacker can
bypass ASLR when they exploit the address leakage vul-
nerability to obtain reusable code memory address. For
the ASLR limitations, the scholars proposed more granular
randomization methods. For example, [16], [10], [15], re-
spectively, they use function randomization, instruction ran-
domization, and instruction equivalent replacement method
to defend against CRA. However, the JIT-ROP [19] proposed
by Snow et al. can bypass the these defenses by information
disclosure and ROP attack. In the design of function-level
randomization, Marlin randomizes the internal structure of
the executable code by randomly shuffling the function
blocks in the target binary [7]. They integrate Marlin into
the bash shell that randomizes the target executable before
launching it. Bin FR [6] parses the binary directly, which do
not rely on the source code, and implements function-level
randomization and random padding in the code segment of
the binary to shuffle the internal layout of the code segment.
The code reuse attack uses information disclosure to
obtain the information needed for attack, such as memory
layout speculation, memory out-of-bounds read and write,
read object content, key address information acquisition and
other techniques. And attackers use the key address informa-
tion to construct the gadget chain to implement attack [22].
Protection schemes are always combined with randomiza-
tion and memory page privilege protection. Readactor [23]
defines the scope of controllable object access to prevent
memory discloses across the boundary. XnR [24] uses read
and execute mutex to prevent disclosure of critical address
information, Giuffrida C et al. [8] proposes an approach to
the operating system that minimizes the range of readability
of the program, making the attacker’s guessing ability lower,
but these are fixed strategies and there is false code reading
problem. The encryption of visible pointers and the runtime
re-randomization [25] is a strong defense mechanism against
both brute-force attacks and memory disclosure exploits.
Kangjie Lu et al. present a novel mechanism, ASLR-Guard,
which completely prevents the leaks of code pointers, and
render other information leaks useless in deriving code
address [26]. An alternative line of defense is to invalidate
the leaked information or use destructive reads to prevent the
execution of what was read [27]. Adrian Tang et al. present
Heisenbyte, a system of thwarting memory disclosure at-
tacks using destructive code reads [28]. In the development
of adaptive and fine-grained strategy, proposing a more
detailed information disclosure mitigation scheme can use
the function risk model proposed in this paper. Therefore,
in the presence of memory address information leakage case,
the security metric of function randomization provides a new
direction of exploration against code reuse attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established an attack model with
leakage information of certain given code pointer based on
attack features, which can bypass the fine-grained random-
ization. The function risk is quantified for the first time by
judging whether the attacks are completed through leakage
of the function pointer. Our experimental results have shown
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that enormous individual function leakage will lead to ef-
fective attacks to specific targets. Hence, we propose that
functions’ coupling should be eliminated by programmers
to alleviate the threat resulted by information disclosure. As
for the fine-grained randomization, our experimental results
have illustrated that the judgment criteria depends on the
randomization methods and moreover on the randomized
program itself. Therefore, we suggest that future randomiza-
tion evaluation should be the main basis of judging whether
codes can be hidden or not rather than the transfer distance
of the code.
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